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41. Introduction
The following work will have two main objectives. Firstly, I will argue that one can define agonistic
democracy through the minimum and maximum thresholds of plurality and political contestation
present in any given community. I propose to determine the aforementioned thresholds through an
analysis of the fundamental postulates of the agonistic theory of democracy. Secondly, I will claim
that in order to maintain the presented thresholds we need to incorporate in the theory of agonistic
democracy a particular form of the agonistic state. I will argue, that the need for this particular form
of the state arises from the tensions between the fundamental postulates of the theory of agonistic
democracy.
 The idea that contestation and plurality are inherent values of the agonistic democracy, and
that they have to be limited was already developed by agonistic theorists, such as Chantal Mouffe,
Bonnie Honig, or James Tully.1 My contribution to the general theory of agnostic democracy will be
the idea that political contesation and plurality have to have their maximum and minimum limits
(thresholds), and that those limits can only be guaranteed by the existence of concrete institutions. I
will claim, that without those limits agonistic democracy cannot exist, and that the theories, which
postulate boundaries,  that are too restrictive,  or extensive do not capture the nature of agnostic
democracy. 
 Although Edward Wigenbach already developed the institutional theory of the agonistic
democracy, my aim will vary from his.2 Whereas his objective was to see, whether different types of
democratic  or  liberal  institutions  can  be  applied  within  the  theory  agonistic  democracy,  my
objective is to propose institutions from the perspective of the limits of political contestation and
plurality. 
The importance of the state in the theory of agonistic democracy, which I will present in the
second part of my work (Chapter 5), was already noticed by Chantal Mouffe. Since she has not
5elaborated  extensively  on  the  theory  of  what  she  calls  the  “pluralistic  state”,  I  would  like  to
continue this debate, by presenting the concrete form and role, that the agonistic state should have.3
Other  theorists  such  as  William Connolly,  or  Jacques  Ranciere  criticize  the  state’s  hegemony
without giving constructive propositions regarding how we could accommodate the state within the
theory of agonistic democracy.4 Bonnie Honig, and James Tully only briefly elaborate on the theory
of the state, and mostly do it from the perspective of their (respective) theories of republicanism and
constitutionalism.5 My aim will be to fill those theoretical gaps, and demonstrate why we do need
the state in the theory of agonistic democracy, taking into consideration the appropriate thresholds
of political contestation and plurality. 
 Since I will engage in the course of this work, in a very specific debate about the nature and
feasibility of agonistic democracy, before developing the main argument of this work, I will present
to the reader the whole theoretical framework upon which the theory of agonistic democracy is built
(Chapter 1). The following exposition will not only clarify, in which debate I want to engage but
also,  which debates I  would like to avoid while presenting my arguments.  I  will  start  with the
presentation  of  the  meaning  of  agonistic  democracy,  through  the  exposition  of  the  six
commonalities of the theories of agonistic democracy. Since it is going to be the first part of my
work, I will use this opportunity to introduce the series of terms frequently used in the theories of
agonistic democracy. 
After  the  presentation  of  such  a  general  theoretical  framework,  it  will  be  possible  to
introduce to the reader the basic typology of agonistic democracy (Chapter 2). The differentiation of
the bounded and unbounded forms of agonism will permit me to explain where we can situate the
theory of agonistic  democracy within the general theory of political  agonism. Moreover,  I  will
present the theories of agonistic democracy developed by Chantal Mouffe, James Tully, and Bonnie
Honig,  in  order  to  present  to  the  reader the  debates  on  the  possible  boundaries  of  political
contestation and plurality within the agonistic democracy. 
6In the third chapter, I will already move to the concrete argument about appropriate limits of
political contestation and plurality in an agonistic democracy. Such an argument will be presented in
the  form  of  minimum  and  maximum  thresholds  of  contestation  and  plurality,  which  political
communities have to establish and maintain in order to be denominated as agonistic democracies. I
will argue, that those thresholds can be obtained through the establishment of specific conditions of
contestation and pluralization in political communities, which do not permit the transgression of the
aforementioned thresholds. 
The last chapter will be based on the differentiation  of the ideal and non-ideal theories of
agonistic democracy. As I will try to show, in the latter theory, there arises a need for a specific role
of  the  state  in  agonistic  democracy.  The  following  need  is  created  by  the  necessity  of  the
presupposition of imperfect conditions, in which agonistic democracy is going to operate. I will
argue that if the citizenry cannot maintain the thresholds of political contestation and plurality by
itself, it will need to establish an agonistic state which will help it to maintain those thresholds in
the long run. 
As we can see, my model will consist  of importing a particular form of the agonistic state
into the theory of agonistic democracy. The need for such a state, as I will attempt to show, arises
from the logic of agonistic democracy itself, and a desire to make this theory of democracy both
feasible and appealing. I will investigate, what the meaning of agonistic democracy implies for us,
and not attempt to transform this meaning, or to argue that agonistic democracy should be preferred
over other types  of democracies.  In other words,  the objective is  to  show, what one has to be
prepared to encounter, and change if possible, if he or she wants to establish, and live within such a
specific political community, as the agonistic democracy. 
72. The Meaning of Political Agonism
What needs to be done before developing a concrete typology of agonistic democracy is to provide
an explanation of what agonistic democracy is, and how it differs from other theories of democracy.
The following part will constitute a conceptual foundation, upon which the next chapters of this
work will be built. My introduction to the theory of agonistic democracy will consist of three parts.
Firstly, on the basis of Edward C. Wigenbach’s book Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy: Post
Foundationalism and Political Liberalism, and Mark Wenman’s Agonistic Democracy: Constituent
power in the Era of Globalization, I will present and analyze features that are common to the major
theories  of  agonistic  democracy.  The list  of  the  six  commonalities  of  the  theories  of  agonistic
democracy should be treated as a conceptual approximation, which will clarify for us the meaning
of agonistic democracy, and not the exposition of the definitive meaning of it. Secondly, I will try to
elaborate more on the terms that will be introduced in the list, so that they might be repeated later
with all the possible clarity. In the third part, I will present what I claim to be the philosophical
foundations of the theory of agonistic democracy, namely its anti-essentialism, and anti-rationalism.
2.1 Six Commonalities of the Theories of Agonistic Democracy
As  I’ve already  written,  the  list  of  commonalities  shared  by  the  major  theories  of  agonistic
democracy  consists  of  six  propositions.  Those  six  propositions  are  the  conjunction  of  four
propositions developed by Wigenbach and two propositions proposed by Wenman. My contribution
to this list is, first, the simple idea of combining those two separate lists second, the clarification of
the meaning of the concepts introduced in them and third, the idea of relating those concepts to each
other, so as to further the coherence and intelligibility of the whole list.
8Let me start from Wigenbach’s four propositions, which I will try to paraphrase for the sake of
brevity.
1. There are no transcendental foundations for any given political order.
2. All political orders are the result of hegemonic power.
3. All political orders produce necessary exclusions. 
4. The possibility of violent conflict is always present in democratic politics.6 
And, in order to complete my list, below I present two propositions developed by Mark Wenman.
5. Pluralism is the constitutive factor of democratic politics.
6. Certain forms of conflict can be a political good.7
As I have already introduced all six of the propositions, which will define the general meaning of
agonistic  democracy  for  us,  I  would  to  like  clarify  the  concepts  introduced  within  these
propositions,  and  in  the  end,  try  to  relate  those  propositions  to  themselves.  In  the  following
exposition, I will follow the numerical order of the list, not because it is a necessary reflection of the
importance of the aforementioned propositions, but rather for the sake of clarity for the reader.
2.2 Conceptual clarification of the list
Proposition 1 (There are no transcendental foundations for any given political order): By political
order, I mean here a concrete ordering of the social sphere, with regard to laws and institutions. In
other words, the relations of social agents defined by implicit and explicit “rules of the game”. The
foundations of any political order consist of practices, discourses, and identities of social agents,
9which give a meaning to a political order. The lack of transcendental foundations means that there is
no available set of practices, discourses, and identities, which could  a priori justify, or legitimize
any given political order defined in turn by a set of laws and institutions. It does not mean that
political orders cannot be justified or legitimized at all,  or that those foundations can be purely
arbitrary.  What it means, is that, those foundations are always contingent, meaning they can be
different, and that they can only be discovered a posteriori. As a consequence, one cannot either say
what are the necessary foundations of a political order, or what are those foundations prior to the
knowledge of a political order – i.e., its cultural, historical, and linguistic context. Firstly, as Mouffe
writes - “[…] things could be always otherwise[…]”8, and secondly, as Andrew Schaap points out,
you cannot say in advance what is the legitimate political character of a given community prior to
the political process that determines its character.9 
Proposition 2 (All political orders are the result of hegemonic power): Hegemony in this context has
to be understood, in what I would like to refer here as a Gramscian sense.10 In other words, the
representation  of  totality  by  particularity.  Totality  refers  to  the  onto-political  foundation  of  a
political order. Particularity, on the other hand, should be understood as a particular set of practices,
discourses, and identities of social agents. The fact that particularity manages to represent totality,
implies that some arbitrary set of practices, discourses, and identities is instantiated as a universal
for a given political community. The following instantiation is performed by the linguistic use of the
so-called,  master  signifier  –  some concept,  which  can  represent  a  totality,  and as  consequence
develop  a  stable  set  of  discourses,  practices,  and  identities.11 As  Wigenbach  notes,  hegemony
constitutes a closure of the range of meaning available in any political  community.12 Dominant
hegemony is only particular since in any political community we will be able to find other sets of
discourses,  practices,  and  identities,  which  could  gain  such a  hegemony i.e.,  representation  of
totality. Because hegemony consists in the creation of the foundation of a given political order, as a
10
consequence it determines the character, laws, and institutions of such a political order. By having a
hegemony over foundation, one gains the hegemonic power over the whole political order.
Proposition  3  (All  political  orders  produce  necessary  exclusions):  The  meaning  of  the  third
proposition  can  be  easily  derived  from  the  conjunction  of  the  first  two  propositions  already
presented  above.  If  any  given  political  order  cannot  have  transcendental  foundations,  and  its
contingent foundations are the product of hegemonic power, then any particular foundations that
manage to  install  themselves  as  hegemonic,  exclude  other  possible  contingent  foundations  that
could also gain such a hegemony, and represent totality through their particularity. In other words,
what a prominent theorist of agonisitic democracy, William Connolly, meant by the term “necessary
injustices”13 was that the dominant sets of practices, discourses, and identities exclude other sets of
those entities,  which could also play such a dominant  role.  What,  according to  the theories of
agonistic democracy, is  a priori  impossible, is the existence of  a totally inclusive political order,
which would be able to endorse every possible set of discourses, practices, and identities. Some
options are simply mutually exclusive. We might quote the following passage from the work of
Bonnie Honig, to whose theory of agnostic democracy we are going to return to later:
Every  political-legal  settlement  generates  remainders,  no  matter  how  progressive  or
expansive that settlement aims to be. This is in no way to suggest that all orders are equal
from this perspective; only to suggest that even those that are better than others still depend
upon the supplement of a politics[…].14
The supplement of politics, refers to the above-mentioned exclusion of meaning, individuals, or as
we  were  referring  to  it  before,  sets  of  discourses,  practices,  and  identities.  Coming  back  to
Connolly, in a political community, we are facing the ambiguity between the need for certain forms
of discourses, practices, and identities of social agents in order to determine the character of such a
community, and the impossibility of the harmonious coexistence of all of those entities.15 
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Proposition 4 (The possibility of violent conflict is always present in democratic politics): In order
to fully understand the fourth proposition, we have to introduce, at least in a narrow sense, the
concept of pluralism in democratic societies. The concept of pluralism implies the fact that any
democratic society contains a variety of social agents, whose difference consists in the fact, that
their  identities  are  defined by different  sets  of  onto-political  foundations  (practices,  discourses,
norms). Those agents are members of the same society, community, or, to be more illustrative, we
can say that they share one symbolic space. As a consequence, because of the plurality of the whole
symbolic space,  agents who participate in it  struggle among themselves in order to shape their
society, according to the character of their identities. The plurality inherent to a common symbolic
space leads to the conflictual nature of such a sphere. As Chantal Mouffe indicates - “[...] pluralism
implies the permanence of conflict and division”.16 What the theorists of agonistic democracy want
us to acknowledge is that without external constraints on those actors, such a struggle can have a
violent character.17 By violent character, I mean a conflict which involves the use of coercion by
conflicting parties. Such a conflict can take a variety of forms, from civil unrest to even civil war.
Conflicts do not necessarily have to have a violent character, but it is a certain possibility, which has
to be acknowledged within democratic societies. 
Proposition 5 (Pluralism is the constitutive factor of democratic politics): The meaning of the fifth
proposition can be developed through the additional remarks on the already introduced concept of
plurality in the fourth proposition. As I have already mentioned, democratic societies are plural.
They contain a variety of social agents, with different identities, who, due to their differences, give
different meanings to their common symbolic space. What we should understand by the constitutive
character of pluralism, is firstly conceiving pluralism not as a simple fact regarding the diversity of
democratic  societies,  but  rather  as their  constitutive  factor,  and  secondly,  the  undesirability  of
unnecessary reduction in the diversity of democratic citizens. As we will see more extensively later,
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the diversity of democratic communities can be reduced by various socio-political methods, such as
homogenization, or normalization of social agents. What most of the theorists claim, is that such
methods are, from the normative point of view, wrong and should not be advanced by societies, or
states. Nevertheless, at the same time, they observe both the conceptual impossibility and normative
undesirability of absolute pluralism.18 Some forms of differences among social actors are simply
unwelcome (for  example,  the relation between master  and slave).  Moreover,  as we have noted
above, every political association demands a certain exclusion of meaning from itself. Constitutive
pluralism, refers to the fact that different meanings given to a shared symbolic space by social
agents make such a symbolic space intelligible to them, giving rise to the necessity of politics, or in
other words, the necessity of ordering such a common symbolic space. As Hannah Arendt noted,
human plurality – i.e, the existence of diverse equals within a political community – is the sine qua
non of any political action.19 The concrete ordering of a common symbolic space, the establishment
of  concrete  hegemonic  sets  of  discourses,  practices,  and  identities  is  the  consequence  of  the
constitutive pluralism of democratic societies.   
Proposition 6 (Certain forms of conflict can be a political good): As I have already pointed out, a
conflict between social  agents who are members of the same society is the consequence of the
constitutive pluralism of such a society. Because social agents are different, they want to establish
different sets of dominant discourses, practices, and identities. We could say that there is a struggle
between  them,  in  order  to  establish  a  hegemony.  Of  course,  such  a  conflict  can  have  various
characteristics. From mild forms of conflicts, where social agents accept or internalize established
hegemony, and struggle over small adjustments within it, to intensive forms of struggle, which can
have a violent, or at least potentially violent character. This is exactly the observation developed by
German jurist, Carl Schmitt, who pointed out that the most violent forms of conflict, exemplified by
the possibility of killing each other, define the meaning and sphere of the political. In other words,
13
the sphere of inclusions within and exclusions from the common symbolic space, or as he refers to
it, the division between friends and enemies, social agents that we are ready to kill or die for.20
Agonistic democrats are not supportive of the Schmittian conflict between friends and enemies, but
in the same time, they want to point out, that non–violent forms of conflict within political orders
can have a positive impact.21  It is so because through a conflict the dominant hegemony can be
replaced by another hegemony defined by a different set of onto-political  foundations. Through
such a substitution of hegemonies,  political  orders can become more inclusive,  simply because
newly installed hegemonies will recognize discourses, practices, and identities, which the previous
dominant hegemony excluded. Of course, it may also happen, that a new hegemony will be less
inclusive, then the previous one. Nonetheless, in principle, certain types of conflicts, which lead to
more inclusive hegemonies are certainly welcomed by them. 
Moreover, peaceful forms of political struggle can decrease the probability of civic apathy
and violent forms of conflict. Although I will later extensively elaborate on the theory of agonistic
democracy proposed by Chantal Mouffe, I think, it is useful already at this stage, to introduce some
passages from her work, which will help me to illustrate this point. The first refers to her comments
on the riots of young people in the suburbs of Paris in 2005: 
What surprised many observers was that their [the unorganized groups of young Parisian
rioters] revolt looked like a sheer expression of blind violence without any specific claims.
The rioters had so little faith in politics that they did not even formulate any demands. I
think that this can be explained by the fact that no discourse was available for them to
politically articulate their anger. It could only be expressed through violence.22
What she means by no available discourse, is the fact that the young rioters did not belong to, or
identify with any political group, which through the democratic struggle could try to change their
socio-economic position. According to Mouffe, the violent conflict is the sheer consequence of the
lack of democratic conflict, which would consist in the struggle for a hegemonic articulation of
political order, according to the interests, or articulated identities of young rioters. 
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The second passage refers both to the problem of civic apathy and the already-mentioned aspect of
violent conflicts:
Too much emphasis on consensus and the refusal of confrontation lead to apathy
and disaffection with political participation. Worse still, the result can be the crystallization
of collective passions around issues, which cannot be managed by the democratic process
and an explosion of antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility.23
Again,  as  we see,  the  impossibility  of  identification  with  groups,  be  it  political  parties,  social
movements or political categories such as right and left, which engage in the discursive articulation
of the hegemonic power can lead either to the desertion from the political life or to the violent
character of it.  Both phenomena, I  think,  are rather unwanted consequences,  if one embraces a
commitment  to  democratic  politics.  In  general  terms,  we  can  see,  that  most  of  the  agonistic
democrats follow the philosophical tradition developed by Machiavelli, where conflict is seen as the
indispensable condition of liberty.24 
2.3 The Philosophical Foundations of Agonistic democracy: Anti-Rationalism, and
Anti-Essentialism 
Although  I’ve managed to introduce to the reader both the list and its conceptual clarification, I
would like to present two crucial philosophical aspects of agonistic democracy, which could not be,
I think, inferred by a reader from the list  itself  or the exposition above. The most fundamental
philosophical  aspect  of  agonistic  democracy  in  the  arena  of  epistemology  is  anti-rationalism.
Agonistic theories of democracy are not so much opposed to the idea that reason can determine in
some way a political order, but rather to the idea, that reason should be the prime determinant of
any political order, and that it should exclude other possible factors, which could perform the role of
such  determinants.  Agonistic  democrats  are  opposed  to  the  conceptualization  of  democracy
15
proposed by Jürgen Habermas, and John Rawls, who postulate that the foundations of democracy
can and should be specified solely through human reason, or intersubjective exchange of rational
arguments.25 As we have seen in the second proposition of our list, foundations of political orders,
including democracies, are determined by hegemonic power. The hegemonic (re)articulation of the
foundations  of  political  orders  can  be  achieved  through  an  exchange  of  reasons,  or  rational
introspection performed by individuals, but such possibilities do not exhaust the range of available
options. For the sake of clarity, the hegemonic (re)articulation can be identified by a reader with the
general meaning of rhetoric. Again, the change of  the dominant set of practices, discourses, and
identities can be achieved through the exchange of reasons subject to valid and sound principles of
reasoning, but rhetoric can include other means of communicative interaction. The range of styles
that  can  be  used  for  the  sake  of  persuasion  includes  polemics,  parody,  scientific  reference,  or
emotional appeal moreover, as Alan Finlayson points out “[…] political rhetoric shapes arguments
not  only  out  of  words,  but  moods,  feelings,  and  aspirations”.26 The  way  in  which  we  can
communicate as citizens should not be simply derived from a larger theory of political truth. In
theory of  agonistic  democracy,  politics  comes before philosophy,  or in  other  words,  a  decision
comes before reason. As agonistic democrats claim, in politics there are many more factors at play,
than human reason.
The second important philosophical aspect of the theory of agnostic democracy is its anti-
essentialism in the field of metaphysics. This point must be mentioned, although it is much easier to
derive it from our list, than the last point concerning the epistemology of agonistic democracy. The
anti-essentialism of agonistic democracy is  visible  in the first  proposition of our list.  Agonistic
democrats claim that there is no such thing, as the essence of an individual, political community, or
humanity.  The  subject  is  thrown  into  the  world,  situated  in,  and  determined  by  the  concrete
historical, linguistic, and cultural context that he finds himself in. Of course, those structures might
be  changed  through  hegemonic  articulation,  but  they  cannot  be  essentially  fixed.27 As  I’ve
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mentioned in the first proposition, there are no transcendental foundations of political orders. This
point  is  strictly  connected  to  the  following  philosophical  stance  of  the  theory  of  agonistic
democracy in the field of metaphysics. Although it may be a simplification, it will be useful for us
to bear  in  mind that  in  the theories  of  agonistic  democracy,  entities  are  neither  necessary,  nor
essential, but contingent and relative to a given contexts. The type of subject, that we are dealing
with in the agonistic democracy is what Heidegger proposed with his concept of desein, a mortal
being,  who  finds  himself  thrown  into  time  and  historicity.28 Despite  the  above-mentioned
similarities of the theories of agonistic democracy, there are some major differences, one to which
we should turn in the next chapter, in order to clarify further the conceptual framework of my study.
3. A Basic Typology of Agonistic Democracy: Distinguishing Bounded and Unbounded
Agonism
The following part  of my work will  consist  in the differentiation of the two types of agonisitc
democracy, namely, a bounded and unbounded one. Such an exposition will serve firstly as a further
conceptual clarification of the concept of agonistic democracy, and secondly, as an introduction to
the whole idea of bounding agonistic democracy, which is strictly connected to the next arguments
of my work. In order to establish how to bound the agonistic democracy, whether some boundaries
are appropriate, and who is to bound agonistic democracies, we first have to introduce the meaning
of political boundaries, as such. In other words, what are we to bound in an agonistic democracy? 
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3.1 Unbounded Agonism
In order to fully understand the postulates of the theory of unbounded agonism, it is useful to start
from what Edward Wigenbach refers to as ‘anti–foundationalism’.29 I would like to start from this
particular aspect since I claim, it is the essential part of the theory of unbounded agonism, and the
one from which other postulates of it follow or may be grasped much more easily by the reader. As
we have already pointed out, every political order is founded upon a set of hegemonic practices,
discourses, and identities, which produce necessary exclusions of other possible sets, which could
fulfill the same role within a given political order. Because of the exclusions produced by political
orders, theorists of unbounded democracy,  such as Jacques  Rancière, Alain Badiou, or Sheldon
Wolin, identify the political agon, or democratic actions, with the disruption of those foundations.
The idea of emancipation or collective freedom is identified in their  notion of democracy with
resistance and opposition to established institutions, norms or laws, which citizens are expected to
comply with. Struggles are not to be performed within established rules of a game of any political
community but over those rules. As Rancière claims, institutional politics can be identified with the
general meaning of police, whereas democracy, according to him, manifests itself in the opposition
to such practices of limiting the possibilities of the demos.30 
Another strategy is not to oppose established institutions, but as Chantal Mouffe points out
in her elaboration of the work of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, Empire,  to desert, ignore and
act beyond those institutions.31 Such attitudes focus mostly on emancipation through bottom-up
approaches realized on the basis of social movements. Although, these two approaches differ in
their content, they manifest the same philosophical position of anti-foundationalism. Opposition to
existing hegemonies either through their disruption, or simple desertion. 
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The second important feature of the theory of unbounded agonism is its general tendency to
associate the meaning of democracy with political agonism, or in other words, the struggle against
hegemony. Let us for example, analyze the following passage from Rancière: 
Strictly speaking, democracy is not a form of State. It is always beneath and beyond these
forms.  Beneath,  insofar  as  it  is  the  necessarily  egalitarian,  and  necessarily  forgotten,
foundation  of  the  oligarchic  state.  Beyond,  insofar  as  it  is  the  public  activity  that
counteracts the tendency of every State to monopolize and depoliticize the public sphere.
Every State is oligarchic.32
As we can see here,  democracy is  identified not  with the concrete  form of  the state,  but  with
collective  action,  and  particularly with  collective  action  against  established forms  of  the  state,
which tries to control our public sphere. It is as if democracy was embodied in oppositional and
collective action, and vice versa such collective resistance signifies what is, or should be, meant by
the word democracy. As Sheldon Wolin argues - “Democracy in not about where the political is
located, but how it is experienced”.33 What Wolin wants us to acknowledge, is that democracy is not
about the traditional meaning of popular sovereignty, where the power is claimed to be in the hands
of the demos.  It is rather about the phenomenological aspect present in the fact of acting together,
where  diverse  individuals  can  enjoy  moments  of  commonality,  in  which  they  transgress  their
inherited norms and political forms. According to Wolin, “[…] the access to political experience is
opened  through  revolution  which  activates  political  community  and  ‘[...]  destroys  the
boundaries'”.34 
 In my opinion, the cause of the lack of boundaries in the case of these theories is not that
they identify democracy with agonism. The important conceptual point is that, what they really do,
is to put agonism prior to democracy. Most of those theorists are simply committed to a much
bigger extent to the idea of contestation and resistance, then to the idea of popular sovereignty. As
Christa  Davis  Acampora  argues  -  “[…]  if  one  is  truly  committed  to  agonism  as  a  model  of
potentially  liberating  political  practice,  one  must  be  willing  to  risk  a  democratic  order  in  the
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process”.35 This  is  the  above-mentioned  commitment  that  characterizes,  what  I  refer  to  as
unbounded  agonism,  or  others,  as  radical  democracy.  Although  such  a  commitment,  can  be
obstructed by the identification of democracy with agonism by some theorists within this tradition,
it is precisely this commitment to agonism that differentiates them from other theories of agonistic
democracy. The commitment to agonism, the priority of struggle over the possibility of collective
decision-making. 
The difference between bounded and unbounded forms of agonism can be also grasped
through  the  distinction  developed  by Thomas  Fossen  regarding  emancipatory and  perfectionist
agonism.36 In  the  emancipatory  and  unbounded  agonisms,  conflict  is  instrumental  for  the
emancipation  from hegemonic  power,  whereas  in  the  perfectionist,  and  partly  in  the  bounded
models of agonism, the same conflict serves as a means to the perfection of individual, groups, or a
whole political community. Although, in the bounded model of agonism, individuals can struggle
for the sake of emancipation, in the same time, their objective transgress the emancipatory aim.
They conflict with the existing order not only to disrupt it, but also to improve it. As I will claim in
the next chapters of my study, the possibility of such an improvement may require the limitation of
plurality, and political contestation within the agonistic democracy.
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3.2 Bounded Agonism
As I have introduced in the previous chapter of this thesis, what it means to lack boundaries in
agonistic democracy, in the following part, I would like to present what would it mean to have those
boundaries  and  what  form and  content  they  might  have.  The  part  concerning  the  meaning  of
agonism will mostly refer to the concepts introduced in the previous chapters, what will be new in
this  part,  is  the  concept  of  boundaries.  I  will  present  and  analyze  the  theories  of  agonistic
democracy  developed  by  Chantal  Mouffe,  James  Tully,  and  Bonnie  Honig.  The  analysis  and
exposition  of  those theories  will  not  focus  on their  overall  content,  but  rather  on the  concrete
postulates of what are or should be the boundaries of plurality and political contestation in possible
agonistic democracies. It is necessary to introduce the concept of boundaries, or what one might call
the limits of conflicts and diversity in agonistic democracy, since the rest of this study will consist
of testing those limits (boundaries), checking whether they are appropriate, and analyzing how they
might be concretely applied and maintained in the long run. 
3.2.1 Chantal Mouffe. From Enemy to Adversary.
In the writings of Chantal Mouffe, we can see three main postulates concerning the form of possible
political boundaries in agonistic democracy. The first postulate refers to the meaning of democratic
citizenship, the second to the transformation of the notion of the enemy to that of the adversary, and
finally, the third one, to the Oakeshottian concept of societas. 
Let us start with the first point concerning the meaning of citizenship. Mouffe develops her
conception of citizenship very much in opposition to the previous conceptions proposed by theorists
of  deliberative  and  procedural  democracy.  In  those  theories,  citizenship  is  identified  with  the
endorsement of certain rational principles, or procedures, which are to govern a given democratic
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community.  What  Mouffe  wants  us  to  acknowledge,  is  that  citizenship  is  not  grounded  upon
rational  justification,  but  “[...]  the  ensemble  of  practices,  that  make  possible  the  creation  of
democratic citizens”.37 Citizenship is a certain form of individuality and subjectivity, that one has to
develop  in  one’s  intercourse  with  other  members  of  democratic  society.  There  has  to  be  a
multiplicity of discourses, practices,  and forms of life so that individuals could endorse such a
dominant form of identity.  The meaning of democratic citizenship in Mouffe’s theory of agonistic
democracy is identified with adherence to the ethico–political grounds of liberal democracy, namely
liberty and equality. To be a citizen of a democratic community is to commit oneself to the values of
liberty and equality through a series of practices, discourses, and forms of life enacted by one in
one’s life as a citizen. Even though the identity of a citizen, according to Mouffe, is a dominant
form of  identity  within  any democratic  community,  and  it  has  to  prevail  over  other  types  of
associational identities, that individuals or groups might happen to have, its meaning nevertheless
can be a subject of dispute. As a consequence, even though we cannot dispute the very identity of
citizenship or the adherence to the values of liberty and equality, we may nonetheless, dispute the
meaning of being a citizen of a democratic community, and therefore what liberty and equality
mean for us. 
The second aim of democratic politics, after creating such a form of citizenship centered
around the  dispute over  the meaning of  liberty and equality,  is  to  develop the relationships  of
adversaries  between  democratic  citizens  and  make  it  less  likely  for  the  Schmittian  distinction
between friend and enemy to emerge within the boundaries of the body politic. The conceptual
difference between the notion of the enemy and adversary, is that in the first case, we combat his or
her ideas, and in the second one, we combat those ideas, but at the same time, we respect their right
to  have  those ideas.38 If  we make a  conjunction  of  the  following point  with  the  previous  one
concerning the meaning of citizenship,  a  clear  picture of Mouffe’s theory emerges.  Democratic
citizens  are  struggling  between  themselves  in  order  to  determine  the  dominant  meaning  of
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citizenship, but at the same time, they respect their right to have different opinions, or different
modes of identification with those values. Because of such a combination of struggle and respect,
they can share one symbolic space, and in a non–violent way transform it, without an unnecessary
reduction in their plurality. 
Let us now outline, the third point, which refers to the distinction developed by Michael
Oakeshott, between two models of civil association:  universitas, and  societas. In the first type of
association its members are bound together, because they pursue a common cause, end or goal. In
the  societas,  Oakeshott argues, members recognize themselves as commons, as members of the
same community, because they have an adherence to common rules.39 The rules that they identify
with,  are  the  rules  of  civil  intercourse.  Forms  of  life,  discourses,  and  practices,  which  are
responsible for the production of their identity as citizens. Of course, as I have mentioned before,
such  an  Oakeshottian  res  publica and  its  meaning  determined  by  the  meaning  of  democratic
citizenship, and therefore the meaning of liberty and equality can be challenged and disputed. We
can say, that Mouffe appropriates the model developed by Oakeshott, in order to radicalize it, so
that it better serves her project of agonistic democracy.40 
I claim that the concepts of citizenship, adversary, and societas, developed by Mouffe, mark
the possible range of plurality and contestation within her model of agonistic democracy. Being a
citizen in the agonistic democracy limits the possibility of who you can be as an individual, and
therefore  determines  the  horizon  of  possible  identities,  that  you  might  happen  to  have,  or  be
determined by. Even though you can dispute what it means to endorse the values of liberty and
equality, you cannot dispute those values as such. You might have a plurality of identifications with
the values of liberty and equality, or at least have identifications compatible with those values, but
not identifications which would negate those values. Once you negate those values as such, there is
no  possibility  within  a  democratic  community,  of  creating  a  specific  relationship  between
adversaries, which Mouffe advocates for. What we encounter then, according to Mouffe, are the
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conditions upon which the relations between friends and enemies are likely to emerge. We can
struggle between each other, but only if we respect our right to have different opinions, and modes
of identification. The recognition and active endorsement of such a right forms a condition for the
existence of Mouffe’s modified model of Oakeshottian societas. We might disagree about common
ends, that we happen to pursue within our community, but there is no place for a struggle over the
common rules of civil intercourse that bind us together, although of course, we might dispute the
meaning of such common rules. 
I think, that the last point is the most troubling and the one that I will try to analyze further in
the following chapters, namely, what are the limits to the meaning itself and who decides in the end,
which meaning should be treated as a correct one, and therefore dominant and enforceable within a
given community. The meaning of citizenship, liberty, equality, or rules of civil intercourse might
be of course elastic, but there has to be some limit to their elasticity, or otherwise, they will not have
any meaning at all.41 As a consequence, there has to be something, or someone, who will be able to
say, or be entitled to say, that a given meaning is not a correct one and should not even be a subject
of dispute.
3.2.2 James Tully: Democratic Struggles for Recognition
The central point of James Tully’s theory of agonistic democracy is his definition of freedom as the
independence from arbitrary forms of power. As we remember from our list of six commonalities of
the theories of agonistic democracy, every political order is a result of hegemonic power. The point,
which Tully wants to make within his theory of agonistic democracy, is that although we are not
able to eradicate power from political orders, we are nevertheless in a position to dispute it. The
contestation  of  power  relations,  dominant  forms  of  recognition,  distribution  of  economic  and
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political privileges is performed through the process of inter-subjective dialogue between citizens.
Power as a consequence is not arbitrary because we are free to contest it.42 
The process of the contestation of power relations through dialogue embodies the meaning
of civic freedom and is directed towards mutual understanding and agreement between citizens.
Such an understanding and agreement can be reached because citizens respect each other within the
process of the dialogue itself. It means that the demands of recognition that they make are both
intelligible,  (meaning  understandable  under  present  shared  principles,  goals,  and  values),  and
reciprocal, (meaning citizens mutually recognize their right to make those demands). Of course, the
norms of intelligibility – i.e., dominant norms, values, and goods – can also be an object of dispute.
Nevertheless, some of them constitute a temporary constitutional basis upon which such a dispute
might  be  itself  intelligible.  Some principles,  goods,  or  values  that  a  community  endorses,  are
temporarily placed outside of the political contestation, so that other principles or goods might be
changed, and so that their change can be intelligible to the members of a community.43 
Moreover, according to Tully, the principles of intelligibility, and reciprocity are immanent
to the performed dialogue, but not universal to it. In order to illustrate this point better, let us quote
one of Tully’s passages, where he elaborates on the status of those immanent conventions: 
They cannot be represented in universal principles or in universal institutions. Nevertheless,
they  gradually  gain  their  authority  and  are  given  the  ‘appearance  of  a  transcendental
standard’ by acts in conformity with them on all sides.44
Individuals and groups, who do not respect other individuals, or in other words, do not internalize in
the  process  of  dialogue  the  principles  of  reciprocity  and  intelligibility,  are  excluded  from the
dialogue, and as a consequence from agonistic society itself. Those who participate in the dialogue,
respecting  the  aforementioned  immanent  principles,  generate  bonds  of  solidarity,  a  sense  of
belonging, and are even ready to accept some forms of power incompatible with their identities
since they know and experience that they will be in a position to dispute them in the future.45 
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Let us conclude, by relating the presented theory to the core of the present chapter, namely
the boundaries of agonistic democracy. As we have seen, Tully claims that we can dispute, contest,
and oppose dominant forms of recognition but only on the condition that the demands we make, are
reasonable, intelligible, or we could say, understandable to other citizens from the perspective of
present  goods,  values,  and  principles.  The  radicality  of  any  citizen  has  to  stop  at  this  point,
otherwise, their specificity, or plurality won’t be recognized by agonistic society, and they will be
excluded from it.  The problem with the boundaries  that  Tully draws in his  model  of agonistic
democracy,  is  that  they seem to  be  too  narrow.  As  Hans  Lindahl  points  out,  agon within  any
political  order  is  not  contesting  whether  or  not  certain  things  or  acts  are  legal  or  illegal,  or
acceptable from the perspective of presently endorsed values, goods, and principles, but rather the
very distinction between legality and illegality.46 It does not undermine our judgment regarding the
application of given cases to what we share as a community, but the very idea of what we should
share as a community. In my opinion, Tully is putting too many restrictions on the possibilities of
political  agon, by reducing its  possibilities of contestation to certain forms of dialogue.  Such a
deliberative  form of  democracy,  which  focuses  on  the  contestation  of  existing  political  norms,
cannot capture the very radicality of agonistic democracy, which can go beyond communicative
forms of politics, and dispute within the range of presently endorsed values. 
3.2.3 Bonnie Honig: For the Virtù form of Politics
Let us start  the following presentation of Honig’s theory of agonistic democracy, by reminding
ourselves of the quotation introduced in Section 2.2,  which indicated,  that every political  order
generates so-called remainders.  Since political orders exhibit such a feature, Honig claims, that we
should  engage  with  those  remainders,  firstly,  by  being  attentive  to  their  particular  excluded
differences, and, secondly, by permitting such excluded individuals to dispute and contest political
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orders, which are a cause of their exclusion. The following attitude of engagement with remainders
of political orders, Honig calls, a virtù form of politics. 
What she refers to, as a virtue form of politics, on the other hand, is the attitude, or we could
say  political  methodology,  of  displacing  politics,  by  reducing  it  to  administrative,  or  judicial
problems, and eradicating the possibility of conflict within existing societies.47 In the virtù form of
politics, we should engage with the remainders of the system, that we live in, through as Honig
writes, “[…] civic commitment to practices of agonistic respect and ethos of pluralization”.48 other
words, as citizens, we should be open to, and respectful towards the Other of our community. Such
an engagement does not only permit us to peacefully pluralize our society, but also to diminish the
probability of its disruption, since its remainders, by being included in the process of contestation,
do not have an incentive to violently attack the system as such.49 
I  think  that  Honig’s  theory  exhibits  a  very  interesting  feature  regarding  the  limits  of
contestation and plurality in agonistic democracy. It does not only bound conflict with a certain
agonistic respect in order to diminish the probability of its violent character, but it also wants to
permit for it, so that the whole community would not be endangered from outside by its remainders,
which by necessity it generates. It is as if we were trying to permit for the conflict, in order to
pluralize our society and try to pluralize it, to make a given conflict possible on more peaceful
terms. In Honig’s model of agonistic democracy, those two coordinates of plurality and contestation
seem to mutually reinforce each other, creating the possibility of a vibrant and stable democratic
community. 
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3.3 The Need to Formalize the Boundaries of Agonistic Democracy
In  the  last  chapter,  I  focused on  the  postulates  regarding  the  possible  boundaries  of  agonistic
democracy. My aim was to locate the form and extent those boundaries might have, according to
particular  theorists  of  agonistic  democracy.  The  postulates  regarding  the  boundaries,  which  I
presented to the reader, are scattered around different writings, and do not always indicate, what we
are to bound within the agonistic democracy. As I tried to argue, theorists of unbounded agonism do
not propose any boundaries in agonistic democracy. Mouffe, Tully, and Honig, whose theories I
included  in  the  group  of  bounded  agonisms,  propose  arguments  which  can  be  interpreted  as
propositions of particular boundaries within the agonistic democracy. My objective,  in the next
chapters of this study, will be to formalize those boundaries in terms of the concrete thresholds of
contestation and plurality, and argue that we can define agonistic democracy with reference to those
thresholds.  My claim is  that  without  certain  boundaries  of  contestation  and plurality,  agonistic
democracy cannot exist. As a consequence, I will argue that the theories, which do not postulate
such  boundaries,  or  postulate  boundaries  which  are  too  extensive  or  restrictive,  cannot  netiher
capture the nature of agonistic democracy,  nor make this specific form of political community
feasible.
4. The Limits of Political Contestation and Plurality
In the following chapter, I would like to argue, that one can bound agonistic democracy in terms of
appropriate limits of political contestation and plurality present in a given political community. The
above-mentioned limits refer to both minimal and maximal amounts of contestation and plurality,
which have to obtain, if we want to postulate the existence of agonistic democracy. In other words,
my claim goes as follows: A given community is an agonistic democracy, if and only if its degree of
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contestation and plurality does not fall below, or exceed certain limits. Of course, within such a
spectrum, one will be able to speak about varieties of agonistic democracies, with higher or lower
degrees of contestation and plurality. It may happen, depending upon a context, that in a certain
community it will be better to have a more radical citizenry than a plural one, or vice-versa. As we
will  see,  sometimes,  we  can  even  face  trade-offs  in  the  desired  amounts  of  contestation  and
plurality, or the effects of enhancement of one value by another. 
Agonistic  democracy is  composed  of  two  main  principles:  agonism and  democracy.  In
general, we can say, that the appropriate limits of contestation and plurality are determined by the
necessity of maintaining those two principles. As we will see, democracy demands those limits to
be rather low, and agonism high. As a consequence, political communities in order be denominated
as  agonistic  democracies  have  to  balance  those  two  coordinates  and  fall  within  the  presented
spectrum of contestation and plurality. What has to be pointed out at the beginning, is that it is not
so much an actual amount of contestation or pluralization that we expect to be present in a society,
but rather a certain capacity for contestation and pluralization. It is not perceived as wrong when
you do not contest, but when you cannot do it. As a consequence, I will write not about concrete
limits of contestation or plurality, but conditions, that will enable those limits to be present.
4.1 The Minimum Threshold of Political Contestation and Plurality
Let me present a very important relation between the values of contestation and plurality, which will
substantially clarify the following exposition of their minimal limits. Firstly, the more plural a given
community is, the more propensity it will have to be radical. Let us suppose that the contrary holds,
and  our  imaginable  community  is  homogenized  –  i.e.,  its  members  endorse  and  internalize  a
dominant set of practices, discourses, and identities. What then will be a reason to struggle against a
hegemonic power, or for the establishment of a new hegemonic power? We would face very much
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contradictory circumstances, in which citizens would struggle against themselves, or against things
that they endorse, internalize, and are determined by. As a consequence, citizens have to be plural,
at least to a minimal extent, in order to be willing and able to contest dominant forms of power. 
On the other hand, if citizens do not struggle against dominant forms of power, or are not
able to do so for some reason, then it is very likely, that they will not be able to be plural. The
following relation between the possibility of pluralization and political contestation obtains, since,
as I’ve mentioned in the second chapter,  political  orders produce necessary exclusions,  and are
results of hegemonic power. If citizens won’t be able to contest dominant forms of power, then in
the long run their differences will be dominated by hegemonic sets of discourses, practices, and
identities, or forgotten, because of the impossibility of their expression in the public space, and
therefore their acknowledgment by other citizens. As we can see, those two values may have the
possibility of mutual enhancement. 
Since  I’ve  managed  to  present  the  relation  between  the  possibility  of  pluralization  and
political  contestation,  let  me  right  now  pass  to  the  argument  about  the  minimal  extent  of
contestation and plurality that has to obtain within any agonistic democracy.  Firstly, what has to be
in place in a given community, is what I will call, the objective conditions of contestation. In other
words, citizens have to have institutional possibilities in order to oppose dominant forms of power.
For example,  they must have the possibility of appealing to legislative or judicial  powers,  and
opportunities  to  express  themselves  in  media,  associating  themselves  and demonstrating  in  the
streets, or being a part of a political party. Such a set of civil and political rights is, I claim, the
necessary condition for any agonistic democracy. As Wigenbach argues, citizens must have ’tools’
to engage with dominant forms of power.50 The role of such tools can be partly performed by the
mentioned set of political and civil rights. 
Secondly, we have to consider the importance of the social rights of citizens, which might
enable them to contest power, and form their own hegemonic articulations. It is rather improbable
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that without appropriate education, a certain amount of property, the access to the system of social
insurance or healthcare, citizens will be able to engage with power and contest it. Moreover, even if
the above-mentioned conditions exist in the circumstances of high economic or social inequality,
certain disenfranchised groups of citizens might not be able to influence dominant forms of power,
even if they have a formal political right to do so. Even though it may not be necessarily true, it is
highly probable, that more egalitarian democracies will have more chances to become agonistic
democracies. 
As Dana Villa points out in her analysis of Hannah Arendt’s theory of political agonism -
“[…]  in order to be ‘free for the world’ - in order to appreciate and value the play of perspectives
for its own sake – one must, to some degree, be free of the most pressing concerns of life”. 51 As I
pointed out, it may not only be the freedom from such “pressing concerns of life” that determines
the possibility of one’s engagement with power, but also his or her freedom in this area relative to
others - i.e., the equality of the opportunity to participate in the public sphere. We could say, partly
referring to Arendt, that there has to exist equality of the freedom from the private sphere, that
citizens may enjoy.52 The sphere of biological necessity, repetitive behavior, and subjection to mere
life (i.e., social/private sphere), partly exclude the possibility of participation in the public sphere.
Such an alienation can be acquired through the extensive range of social rights granted to citizens in
any  agonistic  democracy.  The  competition  over  the  dominant  hegemonic  articulation  between
different groups of citizens has to be performed under relative economic and social equality.  
Thirdly, a given community cannot be too stable or static, both in terms of laws, and their
foundations. As Bonnie Honig showed, the question for agonistic democracy is not how to make
certain laws unchangeable, but how to prevent them from having such a character.53 The aim of
agonistic society is how to make its citizenry more politicized, and how to prevent too much order
within their community, or as Honig refers to it, how to cultivate the virtù and not the virtue, form
of politics. In agonistic democracy, we expect citizens to be attentive to exclusionary effects of their
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laws, and be willing to change them, if it is useful, or necessary. If not, then both laws and their
foundations will become internalized by the citizenry, and difficult to change. Moreover, they won’t
adjust to changing circumstances of society, excluding, for example, newly emerging identities, or
practices. 
Fourthly,  in any agonistic democracy there have to be in place the subjective conditions of
contestation. Power relations, which are present in a community, have to be visible and transparent.
Citizens have to be able to perceive them, and know where and how they operate. In other words,
agonistic citizens have to be suspicious towards power relations, and ready, and willing to contest
them. Hegemonic articulations, which establish dominant sets of practices, discourses and identities
should  be  seen  as  political  decisions,  which  promote  certain  interests,  and  are  subject  to
amendment, change, or nullification, and not as naturalized, or moralized decisions, outside of the
sphere  of  political  contestation.54 As  I  have  pointed  out  in  the  first  chapter,  there  are  no
transcendental  foundations  of  political  orders,  and  agonistic  democracy  should  prevent  some
foundations from pretending to perform such a role. 
Fifthly, the range of contestation cannot be limited to the judicial, or administrative spheres
demarcated by explicit  laws and procedures,  that citizens have to comply with.  The conflictual
character of any agonistic democracy has to be able to extend over the whole of civil society and
reach the very social and cultural practices of citizenry. What is a subject of contestation is not only
a political order, but a set of dominant practices, discourses, and identities that determines such a
political order. The exclusion of the latter form of contestation would imply the eradication of the
political  agon as such. The boundaries of what counts as private or public within the agonistic
democracy have to be open, and subject to possible revision.55 There cannot be anything that counts
as the private sphere per se, and therefore outside of possible political contestation. Nevertheless, as
I will show later, there might be spheres, which are established as private ones in the process of
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political contestation, or spheres, which are excluded from the political contestation for the sake of
maintenance of the above-mentioned contestation in the long run. 
4.2 The Maximum Threshold of Political Contestation and Plurality
In the following section, I will analyze the conditions that make the necessary maximum limits of
contestation and plurality possible,  or conditions,  which make the transgression of  those limits
improbable, if not impossible. As I have already mentioned, agonistic democracy is a conjunction of
two principles: democracy, and agonism. In this part of my work, I will show, that the appropriate
limits  of  contestation  and  plurality  can  guarantee  the  existence  of  those  two  principles,  and
therefore agonistic democracy itself. The question, which I will try to answer, is why do we need
those upper limits, and why, once we transgress those limits we lose the possibility of the existence
of agonistic democracy? 
Let me start with the question asked by Chantal Mouffe, which appears in her essay - “Democratic
Politics Today”:
How can the maximum of pluralism be defended – in order to respect the rights of the
widest possible groups – without destroying the very framework of the political community
as constituted by the institutions and practices that construct modern democracy and define
our identity as citizens?56
In other words, how can we reconcile the maximum amount of pluralism and contestation with the
maintenance of democratic community? How to permit for the agon without destroying the demos,
or as Wigenbach refers to it,  “the conditions of association that make community possible”.57 Those
conditions  are  to  be  identified  with  Mouffe’s “institutions  and practices  that  construct  modern
democracy”, or the set of things that binds us together as a political community, and permit us to
collectively decide upon its faith. 
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As I pointed out in the last chapter, an agonistic democracy must be a political community,
in which power is to be visible and open to contestation, laws adjustable and changeable, and its
citizens  constantly attentive to,  and engaging with the  remainders  of  their  community.  It  is  an
unstable community,  and even a community that perceives its  instability as something positive.
Nevertheless, it is still a community that wants to survive, and maintain itself in the long run. The
survival and preservation of its democratic character is dependent upon the existence of authority
and order in such a community. 
Despite  the  conservative  connotation  of  those  two  notions,  they  are  nevertheless,  the
necessary conditions for such a progressive community. Certainly, there does not have to be too
much order and authority,  however there has to be a certain amount,  which will  enable such a
community to maintain itself, legislate, and enforce its decisions. Once those conditions disappear,
there is  no reason why a community,  which is  both radical  and plural,  has to have a  supreme
authority, or why the individuals which form it, should comply with its decisions. 
I claim that the minimum order and authority within the agonistic democracy, cannot be contested.
You cannot oppose the fact, that the community as such exists, has a supreme authority, and is
democratic. As Keith Breen shows in his analysis of Arendt’s political theory, the objective is to 
meld  the  revolutionary  consciousness,  the  awareness  that  the  terms  of  the  political
association  must  periodically  undergo  deep-seated  revision  with  the  ‘old  virtue  of
moderation’, of caution, and wariness as regards the capriciousness of human deeds.58
As aforementioned, where there is great risk, there has to be caution. There is a need for a minimum
amount of order, authority, and finally stability, which would permit for contingency of the public
realm, which we will inevitably encounter in agonistic democracy. 
 Agonistic democracy cannot put into question, or recognize the contingency of, its democratic and
agonistic character. Agon and demos, within such a community, are outside of the possible political
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contestation. This is the very reason, why in the previous chapters, I wanted to draw a distinction
between bounded and unbounded forms of agonism. Whereas in the latter form, the contestation
could include values such as democratic citizenship, plurality, in the former, such a contestation is
not, or should not be permitted. 
So  let  me  ask,  what  follows  from  the  above–mentioned  remarks  upon  the  limits  of
contestation  and  plurality  in  the  agonistic  democracy?  I  would  like  to  argue  that  taking  into
consideration what has been said so far in any agonistic democracy there has to be established a
hegemonic articulation of dominant discourses, practices, and identities, which would exclude the
possibility of the contestation of minimum authority, order, and agonistic and democratic character
of such a political  community.  Citizens cannot differ with respect to the issue of whether their
community  should  have  a  supreme  authority,  be  it  democratic,  or  plural.  As  I  have  already
mentioned,  in  the  case  of  the  analysis  of  Mouffe’s  theory  of  agonistic  democracy,  agonistic
citizenship  should  be  a  prevalent  form of  identity,  which  partly  limits  the  possibilities  of  the
pluralization of agonistic citizens. Moreover, as William Conolly indicates in his book  Identity,
Difference,  and  Democracy,  what  is  needed  is  a  certain  “[...]self-idealization  of  a  contingent
relational identity,  that takes itself to be natural and independent”.59 The achievement of such a
naturalization,  and independence can only be gained through the already-mentioned hegemonic
articulation of the foundations of agonistic democracy. 
Of course, we should be wary of the question of how extensive such a universalization of the
values of democracy, political community, plurality, or conflictuality should be? In the end, those
values may have an elastic meaning, and therefore lead to different results, than those intended.
Leaving plurality, democracy and the minimum amount of order and authority outside of the sphere
of  political  contestation,  may  result  in  too  much  authority,  order,  social  homogenization,  and
political apathy. Nevertheless, this does not imply, that they should be the objects of contestation,
but  rather  that  their  meaning,  which is  outside of political  contestation should be minimal  and
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precise. The following point is exactly what Mouffe lacks in her theory, where she claims that the
meaning of democratic citizenship is open to contestation. Again, it can be, but some elements that
create this meaning should be outside of it.  Otherwise, in the long run we run the risk that the
former general contestation will become impossible. Unfortunately, in this case, we have to face
some trade-offs. 
What  should  be  attempted  is  the  creation  of  political  homogeneity.  As  Sheldon  Wolin
indicates, such a homogeneity does not have to be necessarily equated with dreadful uniformity.60
What we would expect, is a common acceptance, and internalization of the values, which make
agonistic democracy possible, and not homogenization with respect to aspects such as ethnicity,
culture,  nationality,  or  religion.  Although,  it  is  certainly  true,  that  everything  is  in  principle
politicizable, it is not true, that everything has to be politicized.  As Andrew Schaap argues:
Mouffe’s assertion that a well-functioning democracy is one that is highly politicized might
be viewed, as naive, since it may sometimes be the case that democracy is only possible by
taking certain divisive issues off the political agenda.61
What I am trying to argue for, is taking values such as plurality, democracy, and the minimal extent
of authority and order off the political agenda. That is to say, consciously, refraining from making
them politicized issues, through the political homogeneity of democratic citizens established on the
basis of the hegemonic articulation of the dominant set of discourses, practices, and identities. 
Unfortunately,  or  fortunately,  such  a  political  conception  has  to  become  a  moral  one.
Individuals within the agonistic democracy, have to include it within their “[…]  larger and more
encompassing  moral  perspectives  and  identities”.62 In  any  agonistic  democracy,  agonism,  and
democracy constitute  the  basic  laws,  substantive  values,  or  we could  say,  the  spirit  of  such  a
community.  They are  not  constitutional  laws,  but  a  constitution  itself,  which  is  not  subject  to
amendment.  The set  of values, and goods, prior to the legal structure of a community,  without
which agonistic democracy would not be what it is, or can be.63 They constitute the political unity,
36
or as we referred to it earlier,  political homogeneity, within which agonistic democracy can achieve
the maximum degree of plurality and political contestation. 
The  necessity  of  the  achievement  and  maintenance,  of  such  a  political  homogeneity,
demands the exclusion of sets of discourses, practices, and identities that contradict them. In other
words, the identification, and exclusion, of what Carl Schmitt calls, internal and external enemies.
Ways  of  being,  doing,  and  speaking,  which  are  not  compatible  with  the  above-mentioned
substantive values of agonistic democracy. 
Let me refer one more time to Carl Schmitt, in order to give a clearer picture, of what I am trying to
argue for. 
Only parties,  which are  bound to uphold the constitution should be allowed “an equal
chance” to struggle. Parties, which threaten the existing order and use constitutional means
to challenge the constitution, should be subjected to rigorous control.64
Of course, agonistic citizens have to be attentive to the excluded of their community, and constantly
verify, whether such an exclusion is really necessary, or in accordance with the endorsed principles
of democracy and agonism. Nevertheless, at the same time, they have to be aware, as Joel Olson
argues, that “[…] some enemies cannot be turned into friends and some conflicts are inherently
antagonistic”.65 In other words, some differences and conflicts, even in an agonistic democracy,
cannot be reconciled. 
In the end, let me elaborate on the last reason, why plurality and contestation within the
agonistic  democracy  have  to  be  restricted.  As  in  any  political  community,  so  in  agonistic
democracy, we run the risk of the lack of cohesion. This time, it is not so much a cohesion, which
permits citizens to create one political community and avoid disintegration, but rather the cohesion
that  permits  them to  act  together,  and improve such a  community.  The problem with  political
agonism, and especially, with the unbounded form of it, is that it provides only a negative sense of
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public participation based on the political contestation. Nevertheless, what is needed is, as Mouffe
points out, “[…] social positivity in the face of the subversive logic of democracy”.66 The presence
of a shared public space, in which we can talk to each other, and act together. In such an Arendtian
public realm citizens may increase their plurality by differentiating themselves through their acts,
and speeches, and create power through the recognition of common objectives, and cooperation.  
What is needed is civic cohesion, which permits citizens not only to stay together but also to
act in concert. For that very reason, agonistic citizens may be very often encouraged not to pluralize
themselves more,  or contest  existing political  structures, but to act together on the basis  of the
already existing commonalities, laws, and institutions. In other words, sometimes it might be better
for  agonistic  democracy,  when  homogeneity  prevails  over  diversity,  and  acceptance  over
contestation. 
5. The State and Agonistic Democracy
In this chapter, I would like to analyze when, and why, we need such an entity as the state in the
agonistic democracy. I will argue for a particular role and form of it in agonistic democracy. The
presentation of why do we need the state in the an agonistic democracy, and what should be its role
and form within it, will be based on the already presented account of what agonistic democracy is,
and what the appropriate limits of contestation and plurality are within it. I take such an exposition
as especially valuable for the theory of agonistic democracy, since as Wigenbach writes:
Politics  involves  institutions,  and  among  those  institutions,  is  the  state;  to  the  extent,
agonistic democracy proposes a theory of politics, it must also account for the institutions,
including state. 67
Before going into the details of the specific relationship between the state and agonistic
democracy, let me firstly indicate, what I will mean by the term state, in the course of the next
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chapter. By the term state, I mean a concrete social agent that can act rationally – i.e, advance a
certain set of goals through means, that it takes as appropriate for their achievement. Such a social
agent, is composed of the set of agencies, through which it can act, and interact with other social
agents – i.e.,  citizens,  and other  states.68 Principally,  it  is  a territorial  and administrative entity,
which has the monopoly over the use of the means of coercion, and power to enforce decisions
taken by a sovereign within a state (e.g., people, monarch, aristocracy). In a given territory, it has
the supreme authority, and therefore, it is the last instance of appeal for citizens. I will be useful to
remind ourselves right now, that as any political entity,  it  is a result  of hegemonic articulation,
through which social agents accept its nature and partly internalize it. Of course, as a concrete social
agent, it may also form its own hegemonic articulations, or enforce articulations proposed by others.
5.1 The Role of the State in an Agonstic Democracy.
Firstly, we have to ask, why do we need the particular form of agonisic state that I would like to
propose in this section? Or, are there some conditions, or circumstances, in which the state is not
necessary for this specific type of political community? The answer to this question is provided, I
claim, by the differentiation between ideal and non-ideal theory of agonistic democracy. By the
former, I mean, agonistic democracy, in which citizens exhibit a perfect, or nearly perfect adherence
to the values that define agonistic democracy. Referring to what has been presented in the third
chapter, a type of agonistic democracy in which the appropriate thresholds of political contestation
and plurality are established and maintained through the spontaneous interaction of citizens. In such
a  spontaneous  interaction,  citizens  always  treat  themselves  not  as  enemies  but  as  adversaries,
oppose dominant forms of recognition in a reasonable and intelligible way,  and finally endorse
agonistic respect and the ethos of pluralization.
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I  intentionally  refer  to  the  features  of  the  theories  of  agonistic  democracy,  that  were
presented in the second chapter, since I claim, that Mouffe, Tully, and Honig do not take into the
account the following differentiation between ideal and non-ideal theories of agonistic democracy.
They may prescribe a certain ethics to be followed by agonistic citizens, in order to make their
community peaceful and efficient. Nonetheless, they do not ask the question, what if such an ethics
won’t be endorsed by everyone. This question is of high importance, especially in the non-ideal
theory of agonistic democracy, where not every individual or group will endorse a prescribed ethics.
Although they do recognize,  that  this  ethics  may not  be followed,  they do not  specify how to
prevent  such transgressions,  or  what  institutional  mechanisms have  to  be  in  place,  in  order  to
respond to them. 
I claim that in the non-ideal theory of agonistic democracy, there arises the need for a certain
form of a state. We need the state in the conditions where there are not only adversaries, but also
enemies,  where  not  every  opposition  is  intelligible  and  reasonable,  or  where  not  everyone  is
committed to agonistic respect, or the ethos of pluralization. In other words, where the appropriate
thresholds of contestation and plurality, which define agonistic democracy cannot be maintained by
the citizens themselves, there arises a need for a state that could help citizens to maintain them. 
As  I  illustrated  why we  need  a  state  in  agonistic  democracy taking  into  consideration
appropriate  thresholds  of  contestation and plurality,  let  me continue to  the question of  its  role.
Firstly, as has been already said, it has to maintain the appropriate thresholds of contestation and
plurality. It has to step in, where the unity of the agonistic democracy is threatened. In other words,
where  the  political  homogeneity  of  agonistic  citizens  based  on  the  principles  of  agonism and
democracy is undermined by certain groups or individuals within or outside a community. It has to
intervene, where the respectful conflict among adversaries transforms itself, or with high probability
may transform itself, into a violent conflict among enemies. In such conditions, the state may be
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illustrated as the embodiment of the minimal amount of order and authority necessary for agonistic
democracy, that I have described in the section 3.2.  
Secondly, the state has to coordinate the relations among different associations within civil
society, the adherence of those associations to the basic values of agonistic democracy, and the
relation between itself and those associations. What is important to point out on this step of my
argument is that I do not intend to establish the state is “the owner and licenser of politics”69, or try
to promote, as Robinson and Tormey refer to it, “a creeping project of expanding state’s control”. 70
What is intended, is rather the control of the main center of politics, which is the civil society,
according to the basic values of agonistic democracy. The state’s role is to ensure that, associations
within civil society do not try to homogenize their members or members of other associations, or
deny them the possibility of political contestation. On the one hand, the state’s role is to preserve
political homogeneity based on the values of agonistic democracy, and on the other hand, maintain
and enhance social plurality, which is present in the civil society. As Michael Walzer argues, “only a
democratic state can create a democratic civil society, only a democratic civil society can sustain a
democratic state”.71 In our case, we could say, that only an agonistic state can create an agonistic
civil society, and only an agonistic civil society can sustain an agonistic state. 
Thirdly, apart from the supervision of the civil society, the state has to prevent associations
from taking control of it. Let me quote one more time Carl Schmitt, in order to illustrate this point,
“[…]  it’s a dangerous deception when one single group pursues its special interest in the name of
the whole”.72 In Claude Lefort’s  words,  the place of power has to stay empty.73 No association
should be able to control the state, and enforce its hegemonic articulation, through the coercive
apparatus of the state, dominating, and in the same time representing the social totality. If such
conditions are obtained, then not only one association would start to dominate the whole society,
but also the state itself, could lose its claims to fidelity and loyalty. As a consequence, the state has
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to, on the one hand, encourage associations, and its members towards political contestation, and on
the other hand, try to neutralize them with regard to its sovereign power. 
It partly needs to control hegemonic articulations, which through their promoted discourses,
practices, and identities may undermine the basic order and values of agonistic democracy, and the
state’s supreme authority. It may do this through intentional depoliticization of certain issues, which
as I pointed out in the third chapter, should not be politicized in order to maintain the thresholds of
contestation  and  plurality.  Again,  what  we  have  to  be  aware  of,  is  that  even  in  an  agonistic
democracy there are going to be enemies of the social order, which will have to be excluded, or
subjected to rigorous control. The state cannot permit for the transgression of the thresholds of
contestation and plurality, through various ways of acting and speaking incompatible with agonistic
democracy. 
Fourthly, the state cannot limit its role only to the maintenance of order, authority and peace
within  the  agonistic  democracy.  Sometimes  it  also  has  to  play  an  active  role,  enhancing  the
possibilities of citizens towards political contestation, and pluralization. Such an enhancement may
be performed through granting  or  strengthening of  civil,  political,  and social  rights.  As I  have
pointed  out  in  the  section  3.1,  citizens  may need  access  to  certain  institutional  sites,  material
resources, or even the equality of those resources, in order to be able to contest power relations and
pluralize themselves. The provision of such political, economic, and social goods may be efficiently
achieved by the state where citizens themselves cannot acquire them. Again, as we can see, the state
is  necessary,  where  conditions  for  agonistic  democracy  are  not  in  place,  or  where  citizens
themselves cannot assure the existence of such conditions.
42
5.2 The Form of the State in the Agonistic Democracy
In this final subsection, I would like to analyze the form a state has to have, or should have, in an
agonistic democracy. In other words, what form of it is implied by its role in agonistic democracy,
which I have described in the last chapter. I won’t focus here on the specific institutions that an
agonistic state should have, such as for example, representative or participatory institutions, but
rather  on  its  general  form.  By the  general  form,  I  mean its  strength,  extension,  and neutrality
towards civil society. 
Let me start with the question, which has no simple answer; which form of the state are we
confronted with in an agonistic democracy? A strong or a weak form? On the one hand, we are
confronted with the weak pluralistic state,  threatened by its  dissolution.74 To reiterate,  agonistic
democracy is a political community, which contains a multiplicity of associations, which struggle
among themselves over the establishment of their preferred hegemonic articulation. We have to be
aware that in the non-ideal theory of agonistic democracy, they will not only attempt to articulate
the dominant set  of discourses,  practices,  and identities  in accordance with the basic values of
agonistic democracy but also contrary to them, and what’s more important, they will attempt to gain
control of the state. Such an imperfect high degree of pluralization and political contestation may
substantially weaken the state, or even undermine its supreme authority. 
On the other hand, the need for the state to control such hegemonic articulations within civil
society, and attempts to take a control of itself, would suggest a rather strong state, which could
neutralize those associations and protect itself, and its citizens. As David Dyzenhaus writes in his
analysis of Carl Schmitt’s theory of the state - “[...] if one values individual freedom and autonomy,
one should see that see that a strong state is a necessary precondition of this value[…]”.75 The same
observation applies, I claim, to the political community based on the principles, such as agonism
and democracy. If there is to be a high degree of political contestation, and social pluralization,
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there also has to be in place a strong state, which would be in a position to preserve the unity, of
such a radical and plural community based on the specific political homogeneity of its citizens.
Even though, the conditions of agonistic democracy would rather suggest a weak state, the need to
preserve those conditions, calls for a strong state. 
Secondly, let me ask, whether the agonistic state is to be total or partial with respect to civil
society? In other words, whether there are some social spheres, in which state does not, or should
not intervene, or if every aspect of society may be influenced by the state? As I have pointed out in
the previous chapters of this work, contrary to liberal theories of democracy, in agonistic theories of
democracy, there cannot be,  a priori, private spheres, beyond the reach of political contestation.
Apart from the basic values of agonistic democracy, which I have described in the fourth chapter,
every social arrangement may be contested by citizens. 
According to  Kirstie McClure, agonistic democracy “[...]  extends the terrain of political
contestation to the everyday enactment of social practices and the routine reiteration of cultural
representations.”76 This implies, that the agonistic state may be in a position to be obliged to enforce
hegemonic articulations, which will concern the most elementary forms of life of citizens, such as
child education, nutrition, sexual life, or consumption patterns. It does not necessarily, have to do
this, but it has to be in a position to be able to perform such tasks. Of course, it may happen that the
dominant set of discourses, practices and identities will establish quite an extensive private sphere,
but it may also happen otherwise, and the agonistic democratic state has to be prepared for such a
state of affairs. As a consequence, I claim that the agonistic state is rather an extensive state, or we
could even say, a total one, in which society and state “penetrate each other”.77 
Finally, the agonistic state cannot claim to be neutral with respect to its citizens. Firstly, it’s
going to promote the maintenance of agonistic democracy through the control of the compatibility
of hegemonic articulations with the basic values of agonistic democracy. In other words, bounded
plurality and contestation may have a priority over other types of values, that citizens may happen
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to promote. Secondly, the state will enforce hegemonic articulations, which will favor certain sets of
discourses, practices, and identities over the others. Even though such an enforcement might be
temporal, and subject to political contestatation, it nonetheless happens to promote certain values
that contradict possible claims towards the state’s neutrality. 
6. Conclusion
Agonistic democracy is a specific type of political community. As I have tried to show in the third
chapter of my work, it is primarily a political community that is defined by its two main principles:
democracy and agonism. Those two principles can be maintained through the proper balance of the
degree of political contestation and plurality present in a given political community. 
Firstly,  I  presented the minimum threshold of contestation and plurality,  which could be
maintained by the establishment of the subjective and objective conditions of contestation. In other
words, a specific set of institutions, which enables citizens to be willing and able to contest power
and pluralize themselves. 
Secondly, I tried to convince my reader that the maximum threshold of contestation, and
plurality is to be maintained through the preservation of the minimal extent of order and authority,
and a partial  exclusion of the basic  values of agonistic democracy from the sphere of political
contestation. As I claimed, the presence of those two thresholds implies the existence, or at least the
possibility of establishing the agonistic democracy.
 In the fifth chapter,  I  then argued, that if  we are working with the non-ideal theory of
agonistic democracy, then we cannot presuppose, that the presented thresholds will be maintained
by citizens  themselves.  As a  consequence,  I  have  postulated  a  particular  form and role  of  the
agonistic state, which would be in a position, to help the citizenry to maintain the aforementioned
thresholds. 
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In the model of agonistic democracy developed in this work, the state, where it is necessary,
intervenes in the civil society, and as a consequence guarantees the possibility of maintaining the
thresholds of political  contestation and plurality.  Is the establishment of such an agonistic state
probable? Maybe it is not, but the probability of its establishment was not, the aim of my argument.
The aforementioned form of the agonistic state is implied by the need to establish the limits of
political contestation, and plurality within the agonistic democracy. The form of the agonistic state
may be neither desirable, nor probable to establish, but it is nonetheless necessary, if one wants to
construct such a political community as the agonistic democracy. 
I  think  that  the  model  of  the  agonistic  state  developed above,  is  that  which  makes the
instantiation of agonistic democracy possible. Even though, the establishment of the thresholds of
contestation and plurality, and the agonistic state, which would be at the same time prone and averse
to resistance is not within the reach of most democratic societies. It is certainly a political project,
which in the long run could be endorsed and realized by them. Moreover, because of the open
character of agonistic democracy, it is a theory of democracy, which, I claim, could be appealing for
citizens of most modern democratic societies. Such a combination of inducement, and possibility
may one day make this political community a reality. 
Nevertheless, if one wants to make it real, not only do we need more political practice in
case  of  actual  democratic  communities,  but  also,  more  theoretical  works  on  the  nature,  and
possibilities  of  agonistic  democracy.  With  my work on the  limits  of  political  contestation  and
plurality, and the role of the state in agonistic democracy, I have tried to engage in the theoretical
study  of  agonistic  democracy,  hoping  that  it  will  not  only  clarify  the  meaning  of  agonistic
democracy, but also make it more feasible for contemporary democratic societies to achieve. 
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